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ABSTRACT

Contextual knowledge-attribution and natural selection are both processes that
allow knowledge-attributions and organisms to evolve, respectively. The difference
between Contextual knowledge-attribution and natural selection is the existence of
intention: natural selection is an unintentional process that is possible because of random
physical variations while Contextual knowledge-attribution is an intentional process that
is possible because of random memetic variations. Evolutionary Contextualism, as a
memetic theory, is the theory that knowledge-attributions evolve based upon unequal
probabilities within a context created by falsifiable standards that are dependent upon
attributer intentions. If Contextualism is a memetic theory that concerns knowledge, and
memetic evolution is an evolutionary process, I conclude that biological evolution has
significant implications for Contextualism.
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Introduction
The idea that biological evolution by natural selection has implications for
epistemology is not new. Karl Popper and David Cambell introduced the idea that
evolution has implications for epistemology in the seventies. Here I ask what, if any, are
the implications of biological evolution for epistemic contextualism? First, I will address
this question by reviewing some recent versions of epistemic contextualism. In the
second section of this paper I will review evolutionary epistemology, a naturalistic
approach that emphasizes the importance of natural selection as a determining factor in
epistemology. In the third section of this paper I apply the process of natural selection
and evolutionary epistemological concepts to Contextualism. Finally, I apply this
approach to several arguments against Contextualism, and conclude that the notion that
the truth-value of sentences used to make knowledge-ascriptions is context-sensitive
follows naturally from the argument that our ability to come by knowledge is a result of
biological evolution.
Contextualism: Section I
Contextualism Defined
In his paper Contextualism and Skepticism, Stewart Cohen defines Contextualism
as an epistemological theory of knowledge that takes the truth-value of sentences used to
make knowledge attributions to depend on standards salient in the conversational context
of the attributor.1 According to Cohen, the intentions of the speaker partially determine
the standards that are relevant for evaluating a knowledge ascription sentence for truth or
falsity. The speakers, for example, may have certain purposes or intentions that are more
or less important to them. For example, if a speaker S is attending an important meeting,
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the standards for whether A knows that S’s plane leaves at 3 p.m. might be relatively
high. The general idea is that the interest that a speaker has in avoiding error will affect
the truth-value of a knowledge ascription of the form A knows that p.
Also, given a particular situation or fixed environment, Cohen claims that because
the intentions of attributers vary, the “standards for knowledge ascriptions can vary
across contexts” and “there is no context independent standard.”2 According to Cohen,
“two speakers may say “S knows p”, and only one of them thereby says something true.
For the same reason, one speaker may say “S knows p”, and another says “S does not
know p”, (relative to the same circumstances), and both speakers thereby say something
true.”3 The apparent contradiction is explained by pointing out that different standards
are in play in each speaker’s context. The standards that determine the truth-value of a
sentence expressed by a Contextualist are regulated by the context of attribution, that is,
the particular situation or environment that the speaker is in as well as their particular
interests. For these reasons, according to Cohen, justification comes in degrees.4
The standards that determine the truth-value of a sentence spoken within a
context are also dependent upon how crucial it is for the speaker to be correct within the
given context. Cohen considers the chance for error to be important because certain
contexts can make the chance for error more or less important to the speaker. “And when
the chance of error is salient, it can lead attributors to intend, expect, presuppose, stricter
standards.” 5 According to the contextualist what is deemed important to the attributer in
a given situation, also influences the standards that they use.
Contextualists such as Cohen reject the entailment principle, which is roughly: S
knows P on the basis of (reason or evidence) R only if R entails P. Instead, knowledge-
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attribution is justified by standards that can vary depending upon the intentions and
purposes of the knowledge-attributor. “Since we reject the entailment principle”, Cohen
writes, “We allow that we can know a proposition, even when there is a chance of error.
When, however, the chance of error is salient, in a context, the standards tend to rise to
the point that our reasons are insufficient for knowledge.”6 Since contextualists reject the
entailment principle, they must allow knowledge of a proposition together with an
accepted chance of error. All knowledge-attributions are fallible, but if the chance of
error is salient enough in a given context, the standards of the speaker within that context
will rise, even to the point of being insufficient for knowledge.
First, according to Cohen, the reasons that a speaker has in expressing a sentence,
influences the truth of the sentence uttered. Also, given a particular situation or fixed
environment contextualists claim that because the intentions of attributers vary across
contexts, the standards for knowledge-attributions can also vary. Cohen claims that
standards do not exist outside of context. Furthermore, Cohen also considers the chance
for error to be important. Certain contexts can make the chance for error more or less
important to the speaker uttering a sentence, and so can change the standards upon which
the truth-value of the sentence is dependent. If the chance of error stands out
conspicuously enough to the speaker in a given context, the standards that the speaker
uses tend to rise to the point that her reasons are inadequate for knowledge-attribution.
Contextualism and Skepticism
Keith DeRose, in his paper Assertion, Knowledge, and Context, also points out
that “the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences
(sentences of the form “S knows that P” and “S doesn’t know that P” and related variants
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of such sentences) fluctuate in certain ways according to the context in which they are
uttered.”7 DeRose, however, believes that contextualist accounts of knowledge
attributions are a response to philosophical skepticism.8
DeRose uses a rule of sensitivity to determine standards in a context. DeRose's
Rule of Sensitivity states that:
“When someone asserts that S knows (or does not
know) that P, the standards for knowledge tend to be
raised, if need be, to a level such that S's belief that
P must be sensitive if it is to count as knowledge.” 9

According to DeRose’s Rule of Sensitivity, “a ‘low standards’ case in which [x] seems
quite appropriately and truthfully to ascribe knowledge to [S] will be paired with a ‘high
standards’ case in which [x] in a quite different and more demanding context seems with
equal propriety and truth to say that [S] (or a similarly positioned subject) does not
know.”10
Like Cohen, DeRose claims that standards vary across contexts. He points out
that there are a wide variety of different standards that can be used by the contextualist in
different ordinary contexts, but when more skeptical situations arise, those that call for
higher standards, the contextualist uses more substantial examples (less radically
skeptical) to attribute knowledge in that context. He writes, “To make the relevant
intuitions as strong as possible, the contextualist will choose a “high standards” case that
is not as ethereal as a typical philosophical discussion of radical skepticism: a “skeptical
hypothesis” may be employed, but it will be much more moderate than the playthings of
philosophers (brains in vats, evil geniuses, or what not)”11

Gowan, John Mark, 2006, UMSL, p. 8
Standards are dependent upon contexts of ascription even in those contexts in
which radically skeptical claims are made such as being a brain in a vat rather than a
living human being with hands and feet. In such situations, DeRose claims that it
becomes difficult to assert anything.12 Fewer and fewer things become able to be
asserted until nothing is available to justify any knowledge-claim. In such a radically
skeptical context, the lack of any justification means that knowledge-attribution is not
possible. The lack of justification in a radically skeptical context is not special to
Contextualism. Rather, DeRose claims it is a problem for all epistemological theories.
So, like Cohen, DeRose points out that there are a wide variety of different
standards that can be used by the contextualist in different ordinary contexts, but adds
that when more skeptical situations arise, those that call for higher standards, the
contextualist uses more substantial examples (less radically skeptical) to attribute
knowledge in that context. He also claims that Contextualism as a theory of knowledge
is primarily a response to philosophical skepticism. In contexts where philosophical
skepticism is used as the standard, the lack of any justification means that knowledgeattribution is impossible, but this is a problem for all epistemological theories.

Section II: Evolutionary Implications on Epistemology
In this paper I am arguing that evolution has certain implications for knowledgeattributions. With that in mind, I think that a short digression into the implications of
biological evolution for epistemology is in order. Regardless if one agrees or disagrees
with theories entailed in the Evolutionary Epistemology (EE), it is widely accepted that
life is the result of biological evolution. I am presenting a section on Evolutionary
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Epistemology, because it is important to understand that biological evolution plays an
important role in what we are capable of knowing, how we know, and even why we
think. I will first start with a short overview of EE. Secondly, I will study some of the
ramifications of biological evolution for knowledge-attribution. And thirdly, I will study
what implications that evolution has for our ability to learn and communicate.
Evolutionary Epistemology
Evolutionary Epistemology seeks to explain the principles upon which we base
knowledge-attributions, and how those principles are connected to biological evolution.
Evolutionary Epistemology (EE), a term coined by David Cambell is Karl Popper’s
theory that there are ramifications that biological evolution has for knowledgeattributions (Cambell, 1974). According to Popper knowledge is to be understood as a
continuation of animal knowledge (Popper, 1972, 1986, 1999). There are three features
of EE that I will discuss here. First I will discuss hypothetical realism, then hypotheticaldeduction (falsification), and lastly the evolutionary limitation of cognitive tools.
EE, a naturalistic epistemology, makes the claim that our cognitive beliefs are in
line at least partially with how the world really is. The claim that there is a real world
that is independent of us is known as hypothetical realism. It claims that the world is at
least partially knowable and understandable by us, and that our knowledge about the
world is, as Gerhard Vollmer states, “hypothetical and always preliminary.”13
Naturalized epistemologies defend a hypothetical realism, and claim universality because
all life, and hence all knowledge, is entailed by the fact that of biological evolution by
natural selection.
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Also, the success of our knowledge-attributions is not only dependent upon their
quality, but also on how effective they are in that world. This means that knowledgeattributions are based on a defendable cost-benefit ratio between the attribution made and
the environment that it is made in. If a knowledge-attribution helps the attributer to
understand the world, then it is considered to be beneficial. The cost of knowing is the
work it takes to understand the world: the more beneficial, the more the cost.
The claim that there is a real world that is independent of us is also known as
scientific realism (Smith, 2003). Scientific realism, according to Smith, claims that there
is a common reality that we all share which is independent of what we think and conclude
about it. This common reality includes the reality of our thoughts and theories but is not
wholly dependent upon them. Science has the responsibility of giving us an accurate
representation of what the common reality that we share is. Knowledge-attribution has
the same responsibility. Vollmer’s claim, however, is that our knowledge is always
experimental, and as such is hypothetical (Vollmer, 2005). His claim is in line with
Popper’s hypothetical-deductive method, or falsification (Popper, 1999).
Peter-Godfrey Smith writes, “Falsificationism claims that a hypothesis is
scientific if and only if it has the potential to be refuted by some possible observation.”14
Given falsificationism, the evolutionary epistemologist never justifies knowledgeattributions (Smith, 2003). Rather, those that are not falsified (those that survive
falsification) are accepted, and those that are falsified are not accepted. Metaphorically
speaking, biological evolution “falsifies” organisms when those organisms are not able to
adapt to the environment: the organism becomes extinct, and hence does not procreate.
An organism’s survival relies upon its fitness characteristics, and how effective such
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characteristics are in helping the organism to survive in the environment that it is in. The
process of falsification does not end with a true, justified belief, but with an accepted
theory that is capable of being falsified. Falsifiable knowledge-attributions are accepted
because they are unable to be falsified. In other words, evolution simply keeps what
works, until something more beneficial comes along.15
Gerhard Vollmer writes that EE is distinguished by two traits: “by its claim to
universality and by the limitation of tools admitted for describing and explaining the
world.”16 Given its universality, EE limits the tools that we have to make knowledgeclaims, such as the ability to learn and the use of language, to those that are possible
because of biological evolution. It does not allow for unseen or unexplainable forces to
be used as tools for describing and explaining the world. But evolution is not perfect, and
neither is our ability to come by knowledge. Because our intuitions fail regularly, we
must depend upon other cognitive tools to learn about the world, and the most important
thinking tool we have is language (Vollmer, 2005).
To reiterate, Evolutionary Epistemology (EE) makes the claim that there are
ramifications that biological evolution has for knowledge-attributions. It is a naturalistic
epistemology that defends hypothetical realism. Furthermore, the evolutionary
epistemologist never justifies knowledge-attributions because, according to Popper, “all
human knowledge is fallible and conjectural. It is a product of the method of trial and
error. (Italics added)”17 Rather knowledge-attribution is hypothetical and temporarily
correct based on the ability of the knowledge-attributer to falsify the knowledge-claim.
Lastly, EE also limits the tools we use to learn and communicate. I will review the

Gowan, John Mark, 2006, UMSL, p. 12
consequences of these limits later on, but first, what are the ramifications of natural
selection on knowledge-attribution?
The Ramifications of Natural Selection on Knowledge-Attribution
Elliot Sober describes biological evolution by natural selection as “a developing
entity, extending (and contracting) its boundaries in several directions at once.”18
According to Sober, what explains these occurrences is the idea of natural selection.19 He
states that the process of evolution by natural selection can be divided into three main
constituents:
a) Random variation in the objects considered, allowing for selection
to act.
b) Variation in fitness based on unequal probabilities: some fitness
traits are more conducive to procreation, and hence survival.
c) Heritable characteristics: the passing on of fitness characteristics.
In short, Sober writes, for the process of natural selection to act “there must be heritable
variation in fitness (Lewontin 1970).”20
Evolutionary epistemology claims that knowledge is a by-product of evolution,
and a presupposition of epistemology. That knowledge is a by-product of evolution
comes from the fact that the knowledge-attributer is a product of evolution.21
Epistemology cannot be separated from the fact that epistemologists have evolved. For
that reason, knowledge-attributions cannot be separated from biological evolution.
Epistemological theories have evolved, and continue to evolve just as life continues to
evolve. Knowledge is possible because the epistemologist is able to recognize it by
creating theories concerning knowledge, and she is only able to do so because the ability
to do so has evolved. The first consequent of biological evolution on knowledge-
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attribution is if humans are the product of biological evolution then the claim that
knowledge is the product of biological evolution is necessitated.
Secondly, it is important to note that natural selection is not a random process
although it is a product of random processes. Popper states, “A choice process may be a
selection process, and the selection may be from some repertoire of random events;
without being random in its turn (Popper’s italics).”22 In biological evolution natural
selection involves unequal probabilities rather than randomness (a point that many
creationists do not understand). But natural selection applies to knowledge-attribution as
well. Knowledge-attribution is an intentional process based on unequal probabilities
created from random events.
For example, I recognize that I need to fix my car, but do not know what is wrong
with it. I might recognize that it sputters and is hard to start. Also, so as to not pay too
much money, I want an explanation that I can understand concerning the problem with
my car that is relevant to my car and my pocket book. My interest in understanding why
my car sputters and is hard to start may include chemistry, physics and a whole host of
other variables, but it may not be every possible variable, at least not directly, that I am
interested in understanding in order to understand what is wrong with my car.
If, on the other hand, I want to understand chemistry and physics, for example, I
can use my car to understand those things. To understand why my car won’t start and
how much it will cost me to get it to do so take certain information while at the same time
dismissing other types of information. In this way, the recognition and choice of
information needed, based on attributer-intentions, creates a context in which unequal
probabilities between needed and un-needed information is created. The information that
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helps me to understand why my car doesn’t start is beneficial and needed in one context,
the one in which I want a viable explanation to why my car won’t start so as to not pay to
much for the repair, while information that helps me to understand chemistry and physics
is not helpful (not needed) in the same context. Information may be beneficial in one
context while completely superfluous in another.
The recognition of what it is that I need to understand can be random, but the
process of learning about what I recognize is not. First, what I recognize as beneficial in
one context many times depends upon the context itself. In one context, the importance
of flight times is important, and in another getting my car repaired is important. The
contexts that are created are often created randomly created by a host of variables. But
what is beneficial in a given context is based upon the intentions of the attributer.
In recognizing something as beneficial, unequal probabilities are created by the
intentional act of learning by the potential knowledge-attributer. They do not want to
learn all there is to know, but only that which pertains to their intentions and is beneficial
in that particular context. The ability to recognize and learn about p based upon the
intentions of the attributer and the benefits of p in a certain context create unequal
probabilities between what needs to be both recognized and learned. So, the second
consequent of biological evolution on knowledge-attribution is that knowledgeattribution is an intentional process that involves unequal probabilities created by the
attributor in a given context.23
The third consequent of biological evolution on knowledge-attribution is the
method in which knowledge-attributions are passed on, the heritability traits of
knowledge-attributions. EE holds that because our intuitions fail regularly, we must
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depend upon other cognitive tools, such as language, to learn about the world. The
heritability of ideas through learning and language is also an evolutionary process, and is
limited to the memes we have available to us at a given time. But what is a ‘meme’?
The Evolution of Language
Recently (Dawkins, 1983), the concept of heritable variation in fitness has been
applied to the recognition and replacement of ideas by cultural transmission. Recognition
and replacement of ideas is usually (but not necessarily) a linguistic process and is
considered by Richard Dawkins as being evolutionary by nature. He writes, “Cultural
transmission is analogous to genetic transmission in that, although basically conservative,
it can give rise to a form of evolution.”24 The form of evolution that Dawkins refers to is
similar to natural selection in that recognition of ideas (a) ultimately leads to the
replacement of weaker ideas by stronger ideas (b), which then evolve further by being
heritable (c). Dawkins calls the recognizable and replaceable objects that evolve
‘memes’. The form of evolution, the process by which memes evolve then, could be
called Memetic evolution.
Memetic evolution applies to many forms of knowledge transmission such as
“tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, [and] ways of making pots or of building
arches.” In other words, memes are defined by their representational content, the
information that they represent, which also provides the mechanism for memetic
evolution (Distin, 2005).25 Dawkins believes that “just as genes propagate themselves in
the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate
themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the
broad sense, can be called imitation.”26
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Memes are not only able to change the language that we use, but the ideas that we
have and the contexts in which we have them. Dawkins’ claim is that when “you plant a
fertile meme in [a] mind you literally parasitize [the] brain, turning it into a vehicle for
the meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism
of a host cell.”27 As stated earlier, we must depend upon cognitive tools to learn about
the world, and according to Dawkins, our cognitive tools are the result of a process of
memetic evolution.
Learning is important in memetic propagation, and there are, generally speaking,
two types of learning: non-associative learning, the result of the exposure to the world
around us via our perceptions; and associative learning, the cognitive recognition of the
relationships between events that we perceive.28 Associative learning is important
because it is through associative learning that we come to understand the benefit of a
meme in a given environment. Memetic evolution depends upon associative learning for
propagating successful memes, and so does Contextualism, as I will point out below.
In conclusion, the ramifications of biological evolution on knowledge-attribution
are that because humans are the product of biological evolution, knowledge is also the
product of biological evolution. Also, the learning process is similar to the process of
natural selection. Although natural selection is an unintentional process and the process
of learning is an intentional process, they are both based upon unequal probabilities.
Lastly, associative learning and language evolve by a process similar to natural selection,
and unintentional process, known as memetic evolution, and intentional process.
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Section III: An Alternative to Contextualism
So far I have reviewed Contextualism: a theory that claims that the truth-value of
sentences containing knowledge-attributions vary depending on the standards in play in
the context of use, and evolutionary epistemology: the claim that biological evolution has
ramifications for our ability to know. The fact that human beings have evolved indicates
that their thought processes, their ability to conceptualize and theorize knowledge, are the
product of an evolutionary process. As I will try to point out, this presupposition leads to
a salient relationship between Contextualism, knowledge-attribution and evolution.
Evolutionary Contextualism
If biological evolution can be accepted scientific explanation for the existence of
life, then given biological evolution by natural selection, truth-value is contextual. First,
if Contextualism is a semantics theory for ‘know’, it is possible for it to be construed as a
memetic theory of knowledge. Secondly, if knowledge is a possible because the ability
to ‘know’ evolves, and evolution progresses from ‘mistakes’ (differences in fitness
traits), it follows that fallibility must be accepted as a necessary component of all
knowledge-attributions. Thirdly, given that knowledge is a by-product of evolution,
knowledge-attributions have no context-independent justification. Rather, attributer
standards change according to the ability of an attributer to falsify them within a given
context.
First, Contextualism is often construed as a semantics theory for ‘know’
according to which ‘know’ depends on the standards of knowledge in play in the context
use. If intentions, and therefore standards, make use of memes, which I believe that they
do, contextualism as a semantics theory that concerns knowledge can also be construed as
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a memetic theory. Memes, through the use of language, can evolve according to how
beneficial they are to a knowledge-attributer within a given context. The concept of
heritable variation in fitness (natural selection) can apply to the recognition and
replacement of ideas by cultural transmission (memetic evolution), and as such can be
considered as being evolutionary by nature. Therefore, if language is able to evolve
according to how beneficial it is to a knowledge-attributer in a given context, contextual
knowledge-attribution is at least in part evolutionary.29
Secondly, evolution is able to progress because of slight changes, or variations in
fitness traits. These variations exist because of many biological factors, but the gist of it
is that variations are caused by ‘mistakes’ in heritability. These ‘mistakes’ create fitness
variation, which makes the process of natural selection possible. If trait A fails in a given
environment, and trait B succeeds, trait B is said to be more fit and therefore evolves
further in that environment. Epistemologically speaking trait B is ‘true’ while trait A is
‘false’, but both traits are necessary for natural selection to progress.
Fallibility must be accepted as a necessary component of knowledge-attributions
because there is always a chance of error; the question is how essential that chance of
error is in the attributer’s context. If unequal probabilities are created by the intentions of
the knowledge-attributer then error-salience is based upon unequal probabilities of
importance within a context rather than equal probabilities outside of a context. For
example, let’s call the statement “S knows that P” statement x. When a speaker
recognizes x, she differentiates x from x2, x3, x4 and so on. Even if x2 and x3 happen to be
related to x in some way, the speaker may not be interested in x2 and x3, but only in x. In
differentiating one attribution from a number of random possible attributions by her
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intentions, even related ones, the speaker makes a selection from some repertoire of
random events; without making a random choice.
Although the source of knowledge-claims is quite possibly random, the standards
used in making contextual knowledge-claims are the product of attributer-intentions, and
the ability of the knowledge-attributer to learn. As such, standards are not randomly
generated by attributer intentions but the result of intentions coupled with associative
learning. Attributer intentions and the ability to learn can create unequal probabilities
based on principles such as the Likelihood Principle (Edwards, 1972). Sober defines the
Likelihood principle as a situation in which “O [observation] favors H1 [hypothesis 1]
over H2 [hypothesis 2] if and only if H1 assigns to O a probability that is much bigger
than the probability that H2 assigns O.”30 The standards derived from attributer
intentions in a given context can be the product of the likelihood of one proposition being
true over another in a given context rather than equal probabilities of all possible
propositions being true outside of any given context.
If the standards used by the knowledge-attributer are memetic, which is to say
they are gradable based upon heritable variation in fitness, and based upon principles
such as the Likelihood principle then they are able to evolve because of unequal
probabilities rather than equal probabilities. When the chance of error increases within a
context, the attributer’s standards evolve depending on the salience of error, but also on
how probable or un-probable a speaker has learned that similar standards have been in the
past in similar contexts. Standards are not only based on past experiences, present
intentions and future expectations, but also on what is recognized and understood as true
based on what the speaker considers as unequal probabilities and non-random choices.
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The implications of evolution on standards are that they are not only based on the
purposes and intentions of each attributor of knowledge, but also on unequal probabilities
and intentional associative learning. Furthermore, the process of recognition and learning
can lead to more probable knowledge-attributions because while recognition is not
always an intentional process, associative learning is an intentional process based upon
unequal probabilities and the memetic transmission of ideas.
Memetic evolution provides ideas that are of the greatest benefit to knowledgeattributers in a given context, and based upon memetic fitness, memes continue to be
used in future contexts. Speakers in a given context base the truth-value of their
sentences on their intentions, what they have learned through association and on what
have worked in the past. Memes used by a speaker are gotten from the speaker’s own
experience, the testimony of others, and their own memory; sometimes all three.
Nevertheless memes survive based on their effectiveness in a given environment. If a
meme is able to “survive”, then it is passed on from one knowledge-attributer to another,
from one context to another. Knowledge-attributers keep what works.
“Truth-value” has no evolutionary meaning per say, but is measured against what
is not true. Fitness traits are more or less beneficial depending upon the environment
they are in, but exist in an environment because there are other similar traits that are not
as beneficial in the same environment. Similarly, memes are chosen by how beneficial
they are to a speaker in a given context. Those that are most beneficial become heritable
by the speaker in other contexts, and those that are not either become extinct, or are used
simply out of necessity or ease.31 However, because the evolutionary process has worked
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in the past, organisms that can make knowledge-attributions exist today: philosophers, for
example. Biological and memetic evolution both progress by keeping what works.
Like biological evolution, contextual knowledge-attributions are able to evolve
as well because of slight changes, or variations in speaker standards caused by the failure
of speaker intuitions in a given context. For knowledge-attribution, being wrong is just
as important as being right. When a speaker says “S knows P” and says something true,
that speaker must also recognize that “S does not know P” is false. If a statement is not
true given the standards used in the given context, the statement is not beneficial to the
speaker. If the standard used in a given context is not high enough to substantiate a given
statement, the statement must be considered false or the standard raised; either way the
standard is not beneficial to the statement. Slight changes and variations in knowledgeattributions allow for the recognition of both true and false statements.
The ability to differentiate what is true from what is not true is necessary in order
to make true knowledge-attributions. Not only must we differentiate what is true from
what is not, but we must also recognize our capability of being mistaken. It is the fact
that we are fallible, that our intuitions and the cognitive tools we use fail regularly, which
allows us to make knowledge-attributions because we can differentiate true from false
attributions according to our intentions. It is through fallibility that we recognize
auxiliary possibilities and are able to differentiate true from false statements. We learn
what is true by recognizing what is false.
Thirdly, knowledge-attributions have no context-independent justification.
Rather, they are hypothetical and temporarily correct based on the ability of the
knowledge-attributer to falsify the knowledge-claim. If a speaker claims that “S knows
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that the P” in a given context, one way that the speaker can learn if the claim is true is by
trying to falsify it. If “S knows that P” is consistent with the speakers intentions enough
times, in a given context the standards needed for a speaker to know that “S knows that
the P” can be lowered because the statement has failed to be falsified (it has ‘survived’ in
that given context) given certain standards. Nevertheless, the claim is not justified, but
only has failed to be falsified. If the claim can be falsified, the speaker, if he is a good
learner, will try to learn why the claim was falsified, and raise the standards based on
what he learns. The speaker’s standards are now raised because there is an auxiliary
possibility in which the statement “S knows that P” is false: the context in which the
speaker can falsify the claim.
If a speaker cannot recognize the possibility of being wrong or right because of
the lack of auxiliary possibilities, a radically skeptical context is created. Although such
contexts exist, they are still based upon speaker recognition, learning, and heritability.
The speaker can recognize through his ability to learn what, if any, knowledgeattributions are possible. In such contexts, the ability to make knowledge-attributions is
severely, but not completely limited. In recognizing the context as radically skeptical, the
speaker has created an unequally probable situation simply by recognizing that the
context in which he is in is radically skeptical and learning from that recognition. The
standards that are necessary are either extremely high or impossible. The speaker can
come to know what, if anything is possible to learn in such a context.
The context determines what the speakers intentions will be, at least to an extent,
and from those intentions, standards are set. At the same time, the speaker is able to
recognize that intentions can, and sometimes must change according to the context in
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which they are made; that standards used in a given context are subject to change because
they evolve depending upon the context that they are used in as well as what is capable of
being learned. In all situations, falsification allows the knowledge-attributer to learn and
create standards based on his intentions while at the same time knowing that those
standards can evolve according to the context they are being used within, and what the
attributer is capable of learning.
All knowledge-attributions are falsifiable, even if they are accepted as true. This
means that the truth-value of sentences if accepted is accepted but only contextually.
Temporary knowledge attributions are the result of the evolving standards of knowledgeattributers, based on the acceptance of temporary theories resulting from memetic
evolution. Standards evolve based on recognition, learning, as well as the resulting
recognizable and understandable probabilities that one standard has over another. Rather
than justification, knowledge-attributions and the standards they are based upon depend
upon being recognizable by falsification.
Because there are no justified knowledge-attributions, but only probable or unprobable knowledge-attributions, attributers recognize and learn by falsification.
Learning is one positive trait of using falsification rather than justification. Using
falsification as the test for knowledge claims, true attributions can be made, if only
temporarily, by the ability of attributers to learn. Falsification results in knowledgeattributions in the form of new problems to be falsified. But this is no problem for the
contextualist. As attributer-intentions change, they recognize and replace memes, which
result in new knowledge-attributions within new contexts. Contextualism allows for
temporary situations in which problems can be solved through associative learning.
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Those standards that cannot be falsified cannot be considered valid for
knowledge-attributions. Standards that cannot be falsified cannot be recognized as
probable or un-probable by knowledge-attributers. Therefore, attributers are not able to
recognize and replace old ideas with new ideas resulting in the inability to create new
contexts, and attribute knowledge. In other words, the evolution of knowledge is not
possible because associative learning is not possible. The standards used by the attributor
must be able to evolve memetically, and for them to do so, they must be based upon
unequal probabilities that are recognizable by falsification in a given context rather than
equal probabilities in all contexts. Another result of falsification on Contextualism is that
those standards that are unable to be falsified at time t by the knowledge-attributor are
considered true; those that can be falsified are not true at time t, and those that are not
falsifiable cannot be used as standards.
In conclusion, Contextualism as a semantics theory that concerns knowledge can
also be construed as a memetic theory that concerns knowledge. Secondly, because
knowledge-attributers are the product of biological evolution, theories of knowledge were
able to be created to capture the truth. Also, because of the fallibility factor, knowledgeattributions are possible based on unequal probabilities within a given context rather than
true, justified belief or equal probabilities outside of any given context. Fallibility is
necessary to make true knowledge-attributions because they offer the attributer auxiliary
possibilities to the attributions that they make. Thirdly, rather than justification,
knowledge-attributions are based upon unequal probabilities between at least two
possible attributions, both being recognizable by falsification. Falsification allows
knowledge-attributers to learn through association.
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If Contextualism can be construed as a memetic theory, it can also be construed as
evolutionary. So, given the implications of biological evolution, Contextual knowledgeattribution is an intentional process of problem solving by knowledge-attributers that is
possible because of heritable variation in memetic fitness.
Arguments Against Contextualism.
First, it has been suggested by Jason Stanley that knowledge-attributions are not
context-sensitive. In his book, Knowledge and Practical Interests, Stanley claims that
gradable adjectives fail leading to the failure of context-sensitive adjectives to “justify the
context-dependence of knowledge ascriptions”, which “casts doubt upon the claim that
knowledge comes in varying degrees of strength”.32 But, as a memetic theory of
knowledge, Contextualism allows for growth and acquisition of knowledge: the
recognition of ideas that ultimately lead to the replacement of weaker ideas by stronger
ideas. Gradable adjectives are simply an example of memetic evolution.
Let’s take Stanley’s example:
“If the bank is open, then John knows that the bank is
open, but doesn’t really know that the bank is open.”33
John’s knowledge-attribution concerning the bank does not depend upon the bank
being open. First, John recognizes a chance of error. The chance of the bank not being
open is higher on Sunday, for example, than it is on Wednesday based upon what John
has learned about banks in the past. Secondly, John’s knowledge about banks has been
learned through associative learning. That is, John recognizes that banks are usually
open on certain days and usually closed on others. John recognizes a pattern concerning
the business hours of banks, and bases his knowledge on the pattern that banks are open
and closed. Thirdly, John’s need to deposit a check will influence his decision to take a
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chance that the bank is open or closed. If the need to cash a check is high, his standards
will go up. If the need is low, then the standards will not be so high. Lastly, John knows
that bank is really open only when he is interacting with the world, in the bank doing
business, at a time when the bank is really open.
John’s knowledge-attribution is true based not only on his intentions (going to the
bank to do business), but also on what he knows about banks, based on the business
hours of banks in the past. He is able to recognize and learn through association, that
banks are open and closed during certain hours, and his ability to falsify (or not) the fact
that there is a bank open at time t. John’s knowledge-attributions are more probable if in
the past his attributions concerning the opening hours of banks have been true. His
attributions are less probable if John has been less right concerning the opening hours of
banks in the past. His knowledge attribution is based on a heritable variation in fitness
concerning how well his standards concerning banks have worked in the past.
Stanley also states that the failure of context-sensitive adjectives to justify the
context-dependence of knowledge ascriptions is a problem as well. But, given the
implications of biological and memetic evolution on Contextualism, knowledgeattributions have no justification. The standards of knowledge-attributers are based upon
the intentions, recognition and learning of new memes, which creates the context in
which knowledge-attributions are made. If a meme (any idea, semantic or otherwise) is
falsified, it fails. If it is not falsified it is true, and if it is not falsifiable, it is not
considered a standard of knowledge-attribution because of the lack of salience.
Standards that cannot be falsified are not considered a standard of knowledge-attribution
because if they are not recognized as probable or un-probable by knowledge-attributers,
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no knowledge-attribution can be made: learning is not possible. So, adjectives are
deemed truer or more false based upon their memetic fitness, which is founded on
unequal probabilities rather than justification in a given context.
Those ideas that are not falsified within a given context are true, and those that are
falsified become false. The truth of propositions comes in varying degrees of memetic
fitness. Stronger ideas evolve further by being heritable: they become the temporary
standards in the present because they worked in the past. The temporary standards that
are accepted in one context at time t can be ultimately replaced and a new context created
as our intentions change and we learn more through falsification.
Stanley concludes that the “fact that semantic contents of comparative adjectives
are sensitive to contextually salient standards is irrelevant to the claim that ‘know’ has a
similar context-sensitive semantics.”34 But the intentional attempt by knowledgeattributers to solve problems is an intentional attempt to acquire true knowledge: ‘truth’
being based on unequal probabilities and falsification rather than justification. Attributerintentionality in the problem solving process of acquiring true knowledge, and memetic
evolution lead me to suspect that not only are “semantic contents of comparative
adjectives [ ] sensitive to contextually salient standards”, but that “the claim that ‘know’
has a similar context-sensitive semantics” is true as well.
Secondly, Berit Brogaard suggests that the “allies of contextualism haven’t yet
shown us whether contextualism can succeed in maintaining a notion of ordinary
knowledge while resisting the absurdity that knowledge can be a matter of sheer good
luck.”35 I agree with Brogaard that it is an absurd notion that knowledge can be a matter
of sheer good luck, but I disagree that given biological and memetic evolution
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Contextualist knowledge-attribution is a matter of sheer good luck. Rather, Contextual
knowledge-attribution is intentionally evolutionary, based upon standards that are the
result of unequal probabilities rather than sheer good luck.
Brogaard’s example of knowledge as the result of sheer good luck is a good one.
She writes:
“It is not sufficiently justified if the reason I believe that
every student in my logic class is born on [a] weekday is
that my crystal ball (accidentally) gave me the (right)
answer.”36
Brogaard is correct in stating that if the reason that I use for my knowledge of
student’s birthdays is a crystal ball, I will not have a sufficient reason for my knowledgeattribution. The crystal ball, in this example, does not warrant a standard, and so is not
contextual. Therefore, no knowledge-claim can be made. The crystal ball involves equal
probabilities in a non-contextual environment. Given this, the contextualist cannot learn
from what she recognizes. She cannot tell if the knowledge gotten from the crystal ball is
the result of sheer good luck or not. The probability of the crystal ball being right is
equal with the probability of it being wrong, and as such is not falsifiable. Standards that
cannot be falsified cannot be recognized as probable or un-probable, are equi-probable
and so are not considered valid for knowledge-attributions. However, the contextualist
relies upon unequal probabilities, not equal probabilities.
For example, the likelihood of a crystal ball giving me consistently true
knowledge is extremely low if I have an auxiliary hypothesis such as sheer good luck.
The contextualist, based on the improbability of a crystal ball being able to give a right
answer in this world (if it could be based on a crystal ball in any way), would be able to
differentiate knowledge gotten from a crystal ball from knowledge gotten from sheer
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good luck, given the likelihood principle. The contextualist can differentiate accidental
knowledge from supposed knowledge gotten from a crystal ball given the likelihood
principle together with an auxiliary hypothesis. With no auxiliary hypothesis, no
knowledge-attribution is possible.
Memetic selection is not a random process although it is a product of random
processes. Rather, memetic selection involves unequal probabilities. While randomness
does play an integral role in what knowledge-attributers recognize, it is separate from the
process of memetic selection. Accordingly, the concept of heritable variation in fitness
(natural selection) applies to the recognition and replacement of ideas by cultural
transmission (memes), and is considered to be evolutionary by nature. Memetic
evolution is a process similar to natural selection: it is based upon unequal probabilities
rather than equal probabilities. So, if Contextualism as a semantics theory that concerns
knowledge can be construed as a memetic theory that concerns knowledge, then
Contextualism can be construed as evolutionary, and is not the product of random
variation (sheer good luck), but of unequal probabilities.

Conclusions
Contextualists claim that because the intentions of attributers vary, the standards
for knowledge-attributions can also vary, but are still context-sensitive. Standards do not
exist outside of context. Furthermore, the chance for error is important to Contextualism.
If the chance of error stands out conspicuously enough to the speaker in a given context,
the standards that the speaker uses tend to rise until the speaker’s reasons are to the point
that her reasons are inadequate for knowledge-attribution. However, this problem is not
special to Contextualism, but is a problem for all epistemological theories.

Gowan, John Mark, 2006, UMSL, p. 30
Evolutionary Epistemology holds that there are ramifications of biological
evolution on knowledge-attributions. Because humans are the product of biological
evolution knowledge is also the product of biological evolution. Furthermore, although
the process of natural selection is an unintentional process and the process of learning is
an intentional process, they are both based upon unequal probabilities. Lastly,
knowledge-attribution is possible through learning and language, also an evolutionary
process.
Evolution has several implications on Contextualism. Because knowledgeattributers are the product of biological evolution, knowledge is a by-product of
evolution, which means that fallibility must be accepted as a necessary component of
knowledge-attributions. Contextual standards are based upon falsifiability. Also, the
standards on which knowledge-attributions are made are based on unequal probabilities
rather than true, justified belief or equal probabilities. Therefore, Contextual knowledgeattributions are able to evolve depending upon the environment they are made in.
Contextualism as a semantics theory that concerns knowledge can also be construed as a
memetic theory that concerns knowledge, and so is also evolutionary.
Contextual knowledge-attribution and natural selection are both processes that
allow knowledge-attributions and organisms to evolve, respectively. The difference
between Contextual knowledge-attribution and natural selection is the existence of
intention: natural selection is an unintentional process that is possible because of random
physical variations while Contextual knowledge-attribution is an intentional process that
is possible because of random memetic variations. Evolutionary Contextualism, as a
memetic theory, is the theory that knowledge-attributions evolve based upon unequal

Gowan, John Mark, 2006, UMSL, p. 31
probabilities within a context created by falsifiable standards that are dependent upon
attributer intentions. If Contextualism is a memetic theory that concerns knowledge, and
memetic evolution is an evolutionary process, I conclude that biological evolution has
significant implications for Contextualism.

Notes
1

Cohen, Pg. 94. Also, for the context of this paper, I regard the attributer as a selfascriber and someone who ascribes knowledge to others. (Thanks to George Streeter for
bringing this point to my attention)
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Popper, 1999, Pg. 147.
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Here I should again note that the process of natural selection is an unintentional
process based upon unequal probabilities while the process of learning is an intentional
process based upon unequal probabilities.
24
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25
Distin, Pg. 20.
26
Dawkins, Pg. 192.
27
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28
Distin, Pg. 33.
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29

If bowling can be considered a product of evolution, how can a bowler bowl a perfect
game? The game of bowling does not evolve. A ‘perfect’ game of bowling is when a
player bowls all strikes, and the resulting score is three-hundred. First, the game of
bowling is the product of evolution, and has most likely evolved to be the game that it is
today. In other words, the game did not spontaneously appear: it is the product of the
human mind. Secondly, the intentional creation of bowling also created a virtual context
in which a perfect score is defined three-hundred. However, the only reason a perfect
score is defined as such, is because rules have been developed intentionally which define
a perfect score as three-hundred. The score that defines a perfect game is arbitrarily
chosen as a definition. The game of bowling would not change if a perfect score was
defined as four hundred for example. Knowledge evolves because the intentions of
knowledge-attributers are more often than not, the product of the recognition of some x
that they want to know but do not know at time t1. A bowler, however, starts the game
recognizing a goal that has been intentionally set: the bowler knows beforehand that a
perfect score (300) is the goal of the game. A knowledge-attributer does not have such
knowledge beforehand. Knowledge-attribution has no ‘perfect score’ because
knowledge-attribution is not arbitrary. (Thanks to Andrew Black for this example)
30
Sober, Pg. 32.
31
The use of memes by attributers because of ease of use, the lack of better memes, or
simply out of necessity can be paralleled with the semantic blindness of knowledgeattributers. Attributers continue to use words and ideas that may lead to epistemological
problems, but continue to use them because those particular words are the best cognitive
tools available for the time being. (Thanks to Berit Brogaard for her input here)
32
Stanley, Pg. 35-36.
33
Ibid. Pg. 37.
34
Ibid. Pg. 45.
35
Brogaard, Pg. 1.
36
Ibid. Pg. 16.
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